The Government of Montenegro and the ruling coalition made a significant success by obtaining IBAR, and this is undoubtedly its most significant result in the first year of governance. However, instead of it being an incentive for the implementation of essential reforms, the government began to use this leverage to pursue undemocratic and non-reformist practices. The government seems to have misjudged IBAR as a carte blanche for unchecked actions.
After analyzing the exposé of the mandate holder, the effects of the Government in the first 100 days, and a cross-section of its work in the first nine months, the Center for Democratic Transition (CDT) today publishes the document “The first year of the Government of Montenegro under scrutiny: From the reform momentum to the political detour?” in which it sublimates it’s work in the first year from the perspective of our organization’s scope.
The conclusions of the intergovernmental conference, with EU states granting final benchmarks in chapters 23 and 24 — which allow Montenegro to move to the next stage of the accession process and close the negotiation chapters — are without a doubt the most outstanding accomplishment of the coalition government during this period, despite the shortcomings of some legal provisions, the lack of transparency in the drafting process, the resurgence of prior bad practices, and the misuse of resources to gain an edge in elections.
It is also important to acknowledge the government’s political success in reaching a consensus around the implementation of population census in 2023, which satisfied all parties and was crucial in alleviating tensions that were about to escalate into deeper social clashes.
Following a promising start, there were increasingly evident political moves made by the government and coalition authority that were not regarded as reflecting European or democratic values by the relevant domestic and international instances, which will almost certainly have a negative impact on the dynamic of our European path going forward.
The government’s reconstruction was executed in a non-transparent manner, with disregard for democratic norms and principles as well as parliamentary procedures. It serves as a blatant example of unethical political trade-offs and partitocracy. We obtained a government with the highest number of ministries in Europe (32).
The political concept that underpins the revamped government is far less like administration in a civic state, and more like one in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina that was tailored along ethnic and entrepreneurial lines.
The way the government was established, the number of ministers and their qualifications, the way departments were formed and divided, and the fact that it did not formally alter its program after the reshuffle, all make it abundantly evident that one of the key promises cited in the PM-designate’s keynote speech — the introduction of a meritocratic system — was an empty one.
Regretfully, instead of being a beneficial factor, getting the IBAR and substantial parliamentary support for the new majority turned out to be a negative turning point in the government’s functioning.
After basking in the glory of receiving IBAR, the coalition administration and the government made a number of really questionable decisions. It is evident that the government does not want an inclusive society given how non-transparent the legislative process is in both the parliament and the government. Even the key laws governing the Europe Now 2 program were adopted in an insufficiently transparent manner.
Electoral reform has not produced tangible results so far, in the campaign for local elections in Podgorica we witnessed the abuse of public resources and functions and the wanton abuse of all institutional capacities for the promotion of electoral lists.
The process of targeting the NGO sector was set in motion, as well as a pressure campaign against individuals who opposed the adoption of the law on foreign agents, which was denounced by all the relevant local and international democratic actors. Although several members of the administration have spoken out against this act, the fact remains that one deputy prime minister maintains an active role in this pressure campaign.
The start of the dual citizenship law adoption process, which the EU has once again openly voiced its concerns about, could destabilize the society, and, consequently, thwart the European integration process.
Despite the progress in EU integration and the correct fulfillment of NATO obligations, this government led to the deterioration of relations with its neighbours, and its vice president has been declared a persona non grata in Croatia.
These and other political moves call for vigilance and tighter oversight of government activities. It remains to be seen which course the Montenegrin government decides to take.
Read the complete publication here.
Dragan Koprivica, executive director of CDT
The publication was produced with the support of the regional project SMART Balkan – Civil society for a connected Western Balkans, which is implemented by the Center for the Promotion of Civil Society (CPCD), the Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM) and the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM), and is financially supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs affairs of the Kingdom of Norway.
The content of the publication is the sole responsibility of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Center for the Promotion of Civil Society, the Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM), the Institute for Democracy and Mediation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway.