The idea of adopting a law on “foreign influence agents” in Montenegro has triggered strong reactions from progressive segments of society, as it potentially creates a mechanism for the repression of non-governmental organizations and critical voices. While inspired by the U.S. FARA law, the proposal shares many similarities with repressive legislation used by authoritarian regimes. This publication examines the real motives and consequences of the proposal, highlighting how its implementation could fundamentally compromise Montenegro’s democratic standards and European integration trajectory.
The first part of the publication analyzes the differences between the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and the proposed initiative in Montenegro. FARA is designed to identify individuals connected to foreign governments due to political activities, whereas the Montenegrin proposal targets non-governmental organizations and the civil sector, stigmatizing them as “foreign agents.” Experience shows that similar laws in Russia and Hungary have led to the closure of numerous organizations, while the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that such legislative solutions violate fundamental freedoms.
A section of this analysis is dedicated to addressing disinformation about the work of the non-governmental sector. Claims about a lack of transparency, tax evasion, and illegal activities are refuted with concrete data. Targeted organizations regularly publish all financial reports and operate in compliance with the law. The NGO sector contributes millions annually in tax obligations, conclusively invalidating claims of state responsibility evasion.
The publication also highlights the European Court of Human Rights’ three-part test, which mandates that any restriction on freedom of association must be lawful, legitimate, and demonstrably necessary within a democratic society. The proposed draft in Montenegro does not meet these criteria, relying on vague definitions, targeting civil society without evidence of actual threats, and introducing excessively restrictive measures inconsistent with democratic standards.
Particular emphasis is placed on analyzing the systematic targeting of non-governmental organizations and their activists. Public statements and media campaigns label organizations and individuals as “rabbits,” “mercenaries,” and “foreign agents.” Such rhetoric not only undermines democratic dialogue but cultivates an environment conducive to the potential physical and legal persecution of activists. Comparative examples from Russia and Georgia vividly illustrate how similar legislative approaches systematically suppress freedom of expression and civic initiatives.
In the final part of the publication, CDT offers a democratic pathway for curbing malign foreign influence through a proposal to establish a Committee for Monitoring Foreign Influence, modeled on the European Parliament’s INGE Committee. This approach offers a nuanced mechanism for effectively countering systemic threats like disinformation and cyberattacks without compromising civil society organizations’ essential functions and integrity.
As an EU candidate country, Montenegro must reject repressive solutions and follow European values. Freedom of association and expression are fundamental pillars of democracy, and any legal attempts to restrict them are contrary to the constitutional order and the country’s international obligations.
The full publication can be found here.
Center for Democratic Transition (CDT)
This publication was created with the support of an Ad Hoc grant in the context of the regional project “SMART Balkans – Civil Society for Shared Society in the Western Balkans,” implemented by the Center for Civil Society Promotion (CPCD) Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM) North Macedonia, and the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) Albania, and financially supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway. The content of this publication is the sole responsibility of the Center for Democratic Transition (CDT) and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway or the SMART Balkans consortium.