At the end of last year, Montenegro temporarily closed Chapter 10 in its negotiations with the European Union – the chapter that includes information society and media. This administrative step was hailed as a success. However, until that point, Montenegro had not even begun with preparations for the implementation of the most important European tool for governing the digital space and combating disinformation – the Digital Services Act (DSA).
The DSA marks a fundamental shift in Europe’s approach to digital services. Rather than focusing on individual pieces of content, it places responsibility on online platforms to assess systemic risks – such as the spread of disinformation, election manipulation, hate speech and algorithmic abuse. Platforms must ensure transparency of algorithms, introduce effective mechanisms for reporting harmful content and publish reports on risk management.
In addition, the Code of Conduct on Disinformation – signed by major platforms – has become part of the DSA framework. This elevates the fight against disinformation from a voluntary to a mandatory level. Platforms are now required to show what measures they have taken to curb the spread of fraudulent content, how they have responded to coordinated manipulative campaigns, and what actions they have taken against users or advertisers who repeatedly violate the rules, including by suspending their accounts, limiting content distribution, or excluding them from monetization. This framework comes in response to the lessons learned from the pandemic, the war in Ukraine and the growing disruption of public space in the digital environment.
While the European Union has made serious strides toward digital accountability, the Western Balkans remain largely unregulated and vulnerable. Montenegro, though the most advanced EU candidate, lacks DSA-like legislation. It does not have a regulatory authority that would be in charge of digital services, and there is no institutional coordination. A working group has been formed to draft legislation implementing the DSA and EMFA (European Media Freedom Act), but it will be some time before results are seen. In the meantime, the battle against disinformation is left to the enthusiasm of fact-checking organizations and a few isolated official initiatives.
This institutional vacuum would not be as alarming if the digital space of the Western Balkans were not so vulnerable. Platforms hardly invest any effort in moderating content in local languages. Reports of hate speech, manipulation of public opinion and digital violence go unanswered. Fact-checkers are denied access to data and have limited means of effectively engaging with platforms. In cases such as deepfakes, fabricated insults or coordinated foreign campaigns, citizens are left without protection, and platforms without accountability.
The DSA brings systemic changes precisely in these areas: it holds platforms accountable for algorithmic amplification of falsehoods, mandates cooperation with local fact-checkers, protects users through upholding their right to information and appeal, and introduces precise crisis-response procedures. Platforms that violate the rules are subject to independent audit and financial penalties. But all that applies only to EU member states. In the digital domain, the countries of the region remain beyond the law.
This creates a serious paradox: the European information space is regulated and protected – except when it comes to content originating from Montenegro, Serbia or BiH. Such content can spread freely into EU countries, beyond the reach of the European regulator. One of the arguments in favor of implementing the DSA in the Western Balkans, advocated under the IGNITA initiative with support from the OSF Western Balkans, is that the spread of harmful narratives and disinformation originating from the region can be considered a systemic risk in the context of the European Union and its citizens. As Croatia’s digital services coordinator HAKOM has pointed out, the DSA does not apply to non-EU service providers, such as those coming from the neighboring countries, which may limit the ability to seek legal protection under the DSA. If the Western Balkans remain a blind spot in DSA enforcement, the region risks becoming a safe haven for manipulators.
Montenegro has an opportunity to become a regional champion of change in this area – but this requires both vision and a clear plan. The first step is to adapt legislation on digital services in line with the DSA. The second is to mandate an independent regulatory body (existing or new) with the authority to oversee platforms, and to ensure its adequate professional and technical capacity and resources. The third is to involve civil society, fact-checkers, academia and the media in shaping and monitoring the rules. The DSA is not a tool of control – it is a tool for protection. Protection of democracy, information and public safety.
The European Union must, for its part, ensure that the DSA does not remain the privilege of its member states. This includes financing capacity-building, offering expert support, but also demonstrating political commitment. If the EU can condition accession funds on political criteria, it can also require integration into EU digital policies as part of the accession obligations.
Disinformation knows no borders. Therefore, safeguards against disinformation must not wait for EU membership. They must be part of the integration process itself. Otherwise, we all stand to lose.
This is especially true in today’s political climate, where even within the EU, things are far from perfect. Digital regulations, including the DSA and the Code, are under direct attack. Skeptical voices, backed by powerful lobbies and right-wing narratives, are trying to frame the fight against disinformation as a threat to free speech. A recent text published on the official blog of the U.S. State Department, which described the DSA as an “Orwellian instrument,” is the most visible example of this strategy. Instead of a constructive dialogue, we increasingly hear claims that Europe is “silencing dissident voices” and “persecuting Western tradition” by introducing responsibility into the digital space.
This rhetoric is not only misleading—it is outright dangerous. The DSA does not dictate the truth. It mandates responsibility. It requires platforms to act in defense of democratic values: by limiting viral lies and making sure that their algorithms do not amplify hate, by cooperating with fact-checkers, and by being transparent. For all its imperfections, Europe has shown the determination not to accept digital chaos as the “new normal”.
This is precisely why the Western Balkans must not be included in this effort. If we want EU integration to be meaningful, and not just on paper, then the protection of our digital space must be European as well. Not as the final step in the process, but as one of the first.
Milica Kovačević, Programme Director of CDT